HC raps Punjab over 'official torpor', imposes Rs 25,000 costs for delay in deciding convict’s premature release plea

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has come down heavily on the State of Punjab and its functionaries for their “slumber”, “protracted official torpor”, and “discernible unwillingness to discharge their solemn responsibilities in a timely and conscientious manner”, while dealing with a convict’s plea for premature release.

Justice Sumeet Goel also imposed Rs 25,000 as costs on the State of Punjab, while directing that the amount be paid to the Punjab State Legal Services Authority within two weeks. The Bench made it clear that the “imposition of costs is a necessary instrument, which has to be deployed to weed out such unscrupulous conduct”.

The court further directed the Punjab Home Secretary to file a compliance affidavit within six weeks with the HC Registrar-General of the High Court, while warning that the failure to do so may invite “punitive consequences (as per law) for himself as also other concerned functionaries”.

Admonishing the State for its apathetic handling of the case, Justice Goel observed: “In discharging its adjudicatory functions, particularly those having an effect upon the sacrosanct right of personal liberty of an individual, the State authorities must act with dispatch and diligence. Concerning the slumber on part of respondent authorities, this Court finds itself compelled to deprecate the protracted official torpor and their discernible unwillingness to discharge their solemn responsibilities in a timely and conscientious manner.”

Holding the present case to be “an un-rooting illustration of lack of due diligence” and reflective of an apathetic approach, Justice Goel asserted: “Such a lethargic conduct can be curbed only if the Courts, across the system, adopt an institutional approach which penalises such comportment.”

Justice Goel’s directions came while setting aside the State’s order dated December 17, 2024, rejecting the premature release plea of a murder convict, who had undergone 17 years, 7 months and 28 days of actual imprisonment – including parole, and 25 years, 7 months and 28 days with remission till March 12, 2024.

The court remitted the matter back to the authorities to reconsider his claim for premature release in accordance with law and to pass a “fresh reasoned and speaking order within four weeks”.

State bound by its own premature release policy

In a detailed exposition of law, Justice Goel held that the policies for premature release of prisoners “cannot be rendered empty formality”. The Bench stressed that the policies – being a form of subordinate legislation – would bind the actions of the authorities and every determination was required to be made strictly within the precincts of the policies so formulated.

“The petitioner, being convict, entitled to be considered for premature release in terms of policies, possesses the legitimate expectation of being treated fairly in terms of said policies,” Justice Goel asserted, adding that “any deviation from the criteria laid down in said policies on part of State, while considering the case of petitioner, is liable to be deprecated”.

The court also pointed out that the policy itself stipulated automatic consideration of the case for premature release upon completion of eligibility, without the convict needing to make a separate application. Yet, “no prompt action was taken by the respondent-authorities in that regard”.

“The lackadaisical approach on part of the respondent-authorities, by unnecessarily lingering on the matter under the garb of repeated exchange of communications amongst themselves, has failed the cause of petitioner under the said policy,” Justice Goel noted.

Order “bereft of reasoning” and “unsustainable”

Setting aside the State’s December 17, 2024, order, Justice Goel held that it “cannot by any stretch of imagination” be termed as a speaking order. “The impugned order does not spell out the reasons of the competent authority of its own for rejecting the claim of the petitioner. An executive action must be informed by reason and objective satisfaction must be the basis for an executive decision.”

Calling the impugned order an “inscrutable face of a sphinx”, Justice Goel asserted a non-speaking order “decays into a mere ipse dixit (assertion without proof), which the law considers as an anathema to accountability”.

The Bench added the necessity for an administrative or quasi-judicial “determination” to be a speaking order was not a mere procedural nicety, but unshakable cornerstone of natural justice and the very essence of the rule of law.

 “Right to personal liberty demands fairness”

Emphasising that Article 21 of the Constitution enshrined the inviolable right to personal liberty, Justice Goel ruled that any restriction must conform to “the touchstone of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness.”

“In this constitutional backdrop, it becomes incumbent upon State authorities, while adjudicating upon the claim of an individual for pre-mature release, to act in adherence not only to the principles of natural justice but also to the higher constitutional mandate flowing from Article 21,” Justice Goel added.