Chinese Communist Party implements "Purge Surge"

Hong Kong, October 21 (ANI): Confirmation came from the Chinese authorities on October 17 that nine prominent members of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had been expelled from the all-powerful party that controls every aspect of life in modern China. The announcement came just days before the Central Committee's Fourth Plenum began on October 20.

If rumors prior to the four-day conclave are correct, then only 168 of 205 members (82%) of the Central Committee and 159 of 171 (93%) alternates are present at the Fourth Plenum. Even worse, perhaps just 17 of 44 (39%) PLA members are there. If these estimates are correct, this would underscore how severe Xi's purge of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been in recent months.

The highest-ranking victim of the nine military detainees was He Weidong, once the Central Military Commission's (CMC) vice-chairman. That meant he was number two in the organ controlling the PLA, People's Armed Police (PAP) and China Coast Guard.

The other outcasts dismissed were Miao Hua, former head of the Political Work Department; He Hongjun, former deputy head of the same department; Wang Xiubin, former deputy chief of the CMC's Joint Operations Command Center; Lin Xiangyang, former commander of the PLA Eastern Theater Command; Qin Shutong, former Political Commissar of the PLA Ground Force; Yuan Huazhi, former Political Commissar of the PLA Navy; Wang Houbin, former commander of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF); and Wang Chunning, former commander of the PAP.

Zhang Xiaogang, the Ministry of National Defense spokesperson, stated, "With approval from the CPC Central Committee and the CMC, the military's top anti-corruption watchdog CMC Discipline Inspection Commission conducted investigations on them successively. The probe found the nine people had committed serious violations of party discipline and are suspected of severe duty-related crimes, involving huge amounts, with an extremely serious nature and egregious impact."

Zhang noted that the Central Committee had expelled them from the party and had transferred their cases to military procuratorial authorities for further review. The nonet had already been stripped of military rank and status.

Zhang added that this announcement "once again demonstrated the CPC Central Committee and the CMC's firm resolve to carry the anti-corruption campaign through to the end". As a result, China's armed forces, he claimed, are "cleaner, more consolidated, and possess stronger cohesion and combat capability".

The demise of these figures is not a surprise, for investigations had been announced previously. For instance, Miao Hua was removed from the CMC in June. Miao, along with He Weidong and He Hongjun appear to be the worst offenders, for they were singled out for "strict disciplinary action".

K Tristian Tang, an Associate Fellow at the Research Project on China's Defense Affairs, noted, "The common link between Miao Hua, He Weidong and He Hongjun, and the charge of 'serious job-related crimes', lies in the PLA's personnel management system. He Weidong served as the CMC vice chairman overseeing personnel affairs, while Miao Hua and He Hongjun were the top two officials in the CMC Political Work Department, which manages personnel matters. In other words, problems in the evaluation and promotion of general officers appear to be the central issue."

Tang suggested "the nine appear to have formed an improper network centered around Miao Hua and He Weidong". Miao advanced the fastest, and seven of the nine disgraced personnel previously served in the Eastern Theater Command. Only Yuan Huazhi and He Hongjun did not enjoy this regional connection, but both had direct subordinate relationships with Miao. Several of them also spent extended periods with the 73rd Group Army, and such overlaps likely fostered personal connections.

Tang concluded, "The purge of these nine generals represents one of the most visible examples of CMC Chairman Xi Jinping's ongoing effort to overhaul and tighten control over the PLA's personnel management system. Xi aims to address the military's long-standing problems in promotion and personnel oversight. This explains why political work and discipline within the PLA this year have placed extraordinary emphasis on personnel management."

The public shaming of these nine commanders came just a few days before the conclave set the agenda for China's 15th Five-Year Plan, which is expected to embed Xi's vision for China's techno-industrial dominance. However, based on the numbers quoted earlier, it could be one of the most sparsely attended plenums in living memory, representing a big drop from the 199 members and 165 alternates at the Third Plenum last July. Although illness and travel may explain some absences, most will be due to political shenanigans.

Civilian members of the Central Committee will also be missing, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang; Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Tang Renjian; Yu Jianhua, Director of General Administration Customs who died on December 10, 2024; and Jin Xiangjun, Governor of Shanxi.

Others are known to be under investigation, such as Lan Tianli, Governor of Guangxi; Wang Lixia, Governor of Inner Mongolia; and Yi Huiman, Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission. Others are just plain missing, like Lei Fanpei, Executive Deputy Director of the CCP Military-Civil Fusion Commission General Office; Minister of Industry and Information Technology Jin Zhuanglong; and Liu Jianchao, Head of the CCP International Department.

Neil Thomas, a Fellow on Chinese Politics at Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis, asked: "Do all these absences mean Xi is in political trouble? No. Purges show Xi's political strength, not weakness. Removing high-ranking cadres and generals shows Xi can impose his will on the party and the PLA." Thomas said the contrast with Xi's predecessors Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin is stark, as neither could dismiss generals the way Xi has.

"Much is made of the fact many targets rose under Xi - perhaps it shows pushback from other factions? But after 13 years as leader, everyone has been promoted by Xi these days, and none of the fallen belonged to his true inner circle [such as] Li Qiang, Cai Qi, He Lifeng, etc.," shared Thomas.

"What 'Xi doomers' miss is that he wants purges, if they reinforce his power and make the party stronger. His top priority is advancing the party's 'self-revolution' into a clean, disciplined and effective organization that's capable of ruling China indefinitely. Self-revolution is Xi's 'second answer' for the party to escape the historical cycle of dynastic rise and fall. This stands alongside Mao Zedong's 'first answer' of democracy, a rare instance of Xi comparing himself directly with the chairman."

Thomas pointed out, "Xi's deepest fear is a Soviet-style collapse of the party and its nation-building project, which define both his life and career. Taking power, he faced corruption, decay and moral crisis. Fighting graft has sidelined rivals but also advanced Xi's own China dream."

Thomas concluded, "Despite the 'purge surge', chances of major reshuffles at the Fourth Plenum are uncertain. Central Committee members are not expelled until after internal investigations, which can take years. More expulsions are likely, but most high-level promotions follow Politburo meetings not plenums. Xi is still very much in charge and can remain paramount leader for the next 10-15 years."

Discussing the dismissal of PLA leaders specifically, Dr. William Matthews, Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House's Asia-Pacific Programme, explained that their demise, including those appointed by Xi, "indicates that loyalty and control of the military is more important than avoiding shorter-term instability in command structure and significant embarrassment".

Xi has already stated that the PLA must be able to "fight and win wars". Given that China has martial designs to eventually control Taiwan, this means Xi requires a military that can prevail over the USA in a regional conflict.

Matthews warned, "Material capability is of limited use if not backed up by an effective command structure. Systemic corruption and concerns over loyalty and control have led Xi to extensive purges of the PLA and its associated industrial complex, alongside measures to restructure the PLA for an era of new military technology".

Interestingly, in August-September 2025, the PLARF terminated 74 bid evaluation experts and 116 suppliers from taking part in future contracts. This followed an investigation into procurement corruption covering the preceding nine years. The authorities began investigating the military procurement sector after the titanic fall of then defense minister Li Shangfu in 2023.

Matthews pointed out that Xi's sweeping purges come with attendant risks, however. "In addition to the reputational costs to Xi himself as CCP and CMC chairman, whose personal appointments suggest a pattern of misjudgment, there are consequences for how the PLA is seen by potential adversaries. As Beijing seeks to deter US and allied involvement in a potential Taiwan conflict, any perception of a leadership unable to command effectively or keep on top of discipline risks undermining belief in the PLA's ability to coordinate its branches and implement its doctrine effectively."

Furthermore, "This has the potential to increase the appetite for risk on the part of Beijing's adversaries when it comes to confronting China's efforts to coerce Taiwan and assert its claims in the South China Sea. Likewise, it could well add weight to the perception that the PLA's lack of recent combat experience places it at a disadvantage in relation the US military." Of course, it is possible to overstate how ready the US itself is for combat, given that it has not really fought a peer competitor since the Korean War.

Certainly, it is clear the loss of some PLA leaders has done absolutely nothing to arrest China's military coercion of Taiwan. Aircraft and naval intrusions around Taiwan continue unabated.

There is a silver lining for Taiwan nonetheless. All this upheaval in the military suggests Xi is not ready to go to war anytime soon. Matthews assessed: "Until Xi is confident that a stable, loyal and clean PLA command structure has been established, it is unlikely that he would seek to start a conflict over Taiwan. The importance of success would be so high, and so vital to his legitimacy, that the gamble is too risky unless the outcome is all but guaranteed."

In September, the PLA had expelled four generals: Zhang Lin, head of the Logistics Support Department; Gao Daguang, Political Commissar of the Joint Logistics Support Force; Wang Zhibin, Secretary of the Rocket Force Discipline Inspection Commission; and Wang Chunning, Commander of the PAP, who was already listed at the start of this article.

Wang Zhibin's case is interesting, since he had been transferred from the army to the PLARF after its former commander and political commissar had been sacked. Likewise, the PAP is a vital political tool in the CCP's hands, for this force would quell civil unrest in China. The PAP has contingency plans to deploy PAP troops to the capital to handle any disturbances there. It is therefore imperative to the party that the PAP leadership, who might one day have to execute a Tiananmen Square 2.0 massacre, possess the utmost loyalty and reliability. Clearly, Xi could not trust Wang Chunning, whose career overlapped those of disgraced CMC members He Weidong and Miao Hua.

Xi seems to be relying on a balance of power and fear to keep the military hierarchy pliant. He is not content to co-opt the PLA, but rather he wishes to subjugate it. One can speculate that this churn has probably caused many senior officers to lie low, keeping their heads below the parapet or deflecting suspicion upon others to exonerate themselves.

Yet if Xi cannot trust those confidants who rose through the ranks the same time as him in Fujian Province, who can he trust? Jonathan A. Czin, a fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institute, commented, "If Xi's peers do retire, in his fourth term Xi will find himself surrounded by officials who are a generation younger than he is, with whom he may have little familiarity, and who in all likelihood will be his proteges' proteges."

Who then can Xi trust, and who can he elevate to fill the gaps he has created? (ANI)

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