Take pre-emptive action to curb terror ambushes

Lt Gen Raj Kadyan (retd)

Former Deputy Chief of Army Staff

INDIA has been a victim of terror attacks in Jammu and Kashmir over the past more than three decades. It is well known that the perpetrators are trained, funded and armed by the Pakistan army. There are also reports of terrorists and infiltrators carrying Chinese weapons; the collusion between the two ‘all-weather friends’ is no surprise.

Of late, the thrust of these attacks has shifted from the Kashmir valley to the thickly forested southern slopes of the Pir Panjal range. These attacks continue unabated. Apart from the loss of precious lives, the frequency of these attacks creates doubt, at least in the minds of the uninformed, about the level of preparedness and efficacy of the drills and procedures adopted by the security forces. This has a negative effect on the morale of the security personnel.

A ceasefire has been in place between India and Pakistan since 2003. Its observance was reiterated on February 22, 2021, during discussions over the established hotline between the directors general of military operations of the two armies. It was reported: “In a first joint statement issued by the two sides in years, India and Pakistan said they have agreed to a ‘strict observance of all agreements and understandings and cease firing along the Line of Control (LoC) and all other sectors’ with effect from the midnight of February 24/25.” But the ground reality is different. It is empirically seen that the ceasefire is adhered to only by India. The existing situation ideally suits the Pakistan army in continuing its proxy war practically on a no-cost basis — without fear of retaliation. Even in the latest ambush that took place in the Rajouri-Poonch area on December 21, 2023, in which we lost four soldiers, the responsibility has been claimed by the little-known People’s Anti-Fascist Front, which is reportedly linked to Pakistan-based terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed. It should be assumed that the Pakistani post nearest to the ambush site would have facilitated their infiltration. There is a case for subjecting such posts to appropriate deterrent punishment. Unilateral observance of the ceasefire is proving to be counter-productive.

The perpetrators invariably enjoy local support. There is no doubt that some residents would be helping the terrorists in hiding and sneaking away subsequently. Without such support, it would not be possible for the terrorists to execute an ambush. It would, however, be wrong to suspect a whole village or community. Such support is sporadic and obtained invariably through threat and coercion.

While there is no foolproof system when dealing with jihadis who come determined to kill or die, we can minimise risks and losses. Our forces are deployed to guard the long Line of Control over rough mountainous terrain. The movement of vehicles has to imperatively take place. Though a minimum number of vehicles in a convoy and their spacing are specified, these norms get violated at times.

A vehicle column is the easiest and most vulnerable target for ambushes in the mountains. It is road-bound and visible from a distance. This enables the terrorists to predict its time of arrival and occupy their ambush positions at the last minute, thus minimising the chances of detection. The confined space inside the vehicle also restricts speedy use of weapons.

The many vulnerable sites along the route, which make an ambush easier, can be identified. The site is invariably in a concave loop where members of a group of terrorists can remain in visible contact and in mutual support. The site chosen is also on an ascending slope, where the speed of vehicles is slower. Besides, the site has to have enough foliage or folds in the ground for the terrorists to hide as well as to facilitate their getaway into the forested areas. There is a case for acquisition of land of a 50-metre swathe along the road at these vulnerable sites. These can then be cleared of foliage to make it difficult for the perpetrators to hide. The road-opening parties should also focus on these sites instead of trying to cover the entire stretch of the road, which is not practical.

The vehicles used in these areas need bullet-proofing. This not only reduces the speed of movement but also curtails the life of engines; both outcomes should be acceptable. The leading vehicle in each convoy must have armour plating and a periscopic infrared camera that can detect people hidden in the bushes. Drones can also be fitted with these cameras and used to reconnoitre routes ahead of the convoys.

The Army has been involved in tackling irregular warfare since Independence; it is arguably the most experienced army in the world in this regard today. The number of attacks on its columns might indicate lacunae in its tactics and adherence to SOPs (standard operating procedures). But the reality is that of all the attempted ambushes, nearly 90 per cent get aborted because of a high level of alertness of our troops. These failed attempts do not become public, leading to an incorrect negative impression of the security forces’ level of preparedness.

The unfortunate death of three civilians, allegedly during interrogation by the Army, must be investigated thoroughly and the guilty punished speedily to instil confidence in the public. Anger management is part of the training of troops deployed in such scenarios. Its violation must not be tolerated.

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