The flawed idea of Khalistan

KC Singh

THE Khalistan issue resurfaced in the UK on July 12 when a Sikh gathering announced a bigger rally at Trafalgar Square a month later, under the patronage of Sikhs for Justice (SFJ), to support #Referendum2020. That is an online initiative for an independent Punjab or Khalistan. The issue has long simmered, particularly in Canada and UK, with the largest Sikh diaspora. It became an irritant during Canadian PM Justin Trudeau’s India visit last February, particularly over Jaspal Atwal, convicted of shooting an Indian politician, getting invited to the Canadian High Commissioner’s reception. 

The principal problem is not Canada allowing, under the freedom of speech principle, Sikh hotheads to vent steam, but perceived cosiness of the Trudeau government with radical elements. With a little over 1 per cent of Canadian population, Sikhs hold 12 per cent of cabinet posts in the Trudeau government, having 14 Liberal Party MPs. Sikhs also dominate the New Liberal Party, enabling the elevation of Jagmeet Singh as president. Furthermore, they have noticeable clout in provincial politics in Ontario and British Columbia. Some of these worthies, including Trudeau, attended functions where Khalistani banners were displayed or radicals honoured. Khalistan proponents today have shrewdly adopted non-militant tactics of civil protests, on-line referendums, gurdwara functions, etc., to remain within the ambit of law of host nations. Acts considered seditious in India, as per our colonial era criminal law, are not so in many Western nations. The UK abolished seditious libel by a 2009 Act, putting its Northern Island ghost to bed. 

Canada provides a unique case of federal politics. When Quebec held a referendum on seceding from the union instead of using brute force to counter provincial insurrection, it simply asked the Canadian Supreme Court in 1996 to decide if Quebec could unilaterally secede and whether international law allowed the national assembly, the government or provincial assembly to permit secession. The court pronounced in 1998 that no secession was possible till there was first a successful vote, followed by consultation with federal authority and consensus. Canada held the First International Conference on Federalism in October 1999, where then US President Bill Clinton in his concluding speech said, “When a people thinks it should be independent in order to have a meaningful political existence, serious questions should be asked…Are minority rights as well as majority rights accepted?”

Why then are the Sikhs abroad more agitated than those in India about the rights of Sikhs in Punjab? A number of factors are at play. I dealt, amongst other duties, with the Sikh diaspora pre-Bluestar in New York (1980-83). The largest gurdwara of the tri-state area then was at Flushing Meadows, New York City. While the community was restive over Punjab’s developments, the management was still controlled by educated and professionally successful individuals. PM Indira Gandhi visited the gurdwara during her 1983 US visit, and was honoured. But post-Bluestar, and with counter-terrorism operations forcing many families to send abroad sons caught between militants and security forces, the diaspora’s complexion and those controlling the gurdwaras changed dramatically. 

The change was most pronounced in Canada. Younger, angrier and poorly educated youth began to control gurdwara podiums every weekend, radicalising the discourse. Air India bombing, its inept investigation and lackadaisical follow-up to de-radicalise Sikh youth have led to the current situation. 

On return from India, Trudeau curtailed public bonhomie towards pro-Khalistan elements. But Sikh political activism in Canada, as indeed elsewhere, rests on using gurdwaras for funds and electoral consolidation, much as the Akali Party does in Punjab. Thus #Referendum2020 movement has acquired a momentum that will test India’s relation with a number of Western nations. In the UK, the fulcrum of the new churn, a private UK Sikh Survey 2016 reveals interesting features of Sikh diaspora. Almost half have completed college or post-graduate studies. Another 20 per cent have attended college, but not graduated. Of the total population of over 4.3 lakh plus Sikhs, 69 per cent are UK born and 91 per cent are British nationals. Compared to this, among Hindu diaspora, 40 per cent retain Indian nationality. Over 90 per cent Sikhs would prefer a separate identity and not be dubbed Indian or Asian. 

Historically, religions tend to become radicalised in the face of adversity. Islam’s regression to Wahhabi and arch Islamic conservatism, spurning Sufi or inclusive versions which facilitated its spread beyond the Arabian desert provenance, coincided with the decline of Islamic power, post-Mongol sacking of Baghdad Caliphate in 1258. Ibn Taymiyyah, the progenitor of Wahhabism, was five when his family fled to Damascus to escape Mongols. This Salafist version of Islam was revived by Shaykh Muhammad ibn al-Wahhab in Saudi Arabia in the 18th century as Islamic power declined following the rise of Western colonialism. 

Similarly, Punjab has never fully recovered economically from the terrible twin decades of terrorism which led to de-industrialisation and a top-heavy police state. The problem has been compounded by emigration, low fertility rates, skewed sex ratio, drug menace, joblessness, fragmentation of landholdings and agrarian distress. But above all, it is the crisis of faith as Sikh religious institutions are unable to guide, inspire or enrich the spiritual life of adherents. The peasantry gravitating towards deras, spurious spiritual leaders and alternative belief systems testifies to the rot. 

The cry for Khalistan thus represents this collective angst of Sikhs. Instead of demarches to the UK, Canada, etc., India needs to harness these misguided elements to contribute to solving Punjab’s socio-economic mess. The Modi government must also realise that a Hindutva-laden approach to diaspora tends to exacerbate the communal divide abroad, leading minorities to grasp their own religious identities more firmly. That provides India’s enemies abroad ready-made instruments to use against India. Preparing black-lists, unleashing intelligence resources to penetrate Sikh diaspora and report, etc., have all been tried after 1984. They have trapped parts of the diaspora in isolated opposition to India under a bogus Khalistan demand. An unfortunate consequence and diplomatic failure is Indian diplomats being barred from entering gurdwaras in many countries, thus severing communication.  

Sikh Gurus traversed India, proselytising and intermingling with the masses and saints. Guru Gobind Singh spent his first three years in Patna. Operating from Sri Anandpur Sahib, he gave Sikhism its final shape. He departed this world from Nanded. What then is Khalistan? A small geographical land-locked entity stuck between an inimical India and an exploitative and distrustful Pakistan, in the hands of clergy and radical leaders. Alternatively, it could be a resurgent Punjab becoming India’s California with sustainable agro-industrial growth, provided both the state and Sikhism are led by what Iran’s Imam Khomeini called ‘Vali-ye-Faqih- Guardian Jurists’. Such a Khalistan will have pan-India respect and influence, like the Gurus.

A former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs