IAF set for big role in counter-terror ops

Pravin Sawhney
Strategic Affairs Expert

IN the first such operation, the Indian Air Force (IAF) carried out a strike against the largest training camp of Jaish-e-Mohammed in Balakot, Pakistan. The official confirmation of the strike came around noon in a terse statement issued, curiously, by Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale, who called these ‘non-military preemptive action’ against terrorists, their trainers and handlers.

Three takeaways of the air strike are: One, a retaliation by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is unlikely since by India’s own admission, the targets were non-military (terrorists) and avoided civilian casualties; two, with no military objectives, the strike would work to burnish the image of Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a strongman; and three, major world powers would now worry about an escalation of hostilities between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan.

First, a few technical details. The multi-role Mirage-2000 aircraft that crossed over would have done so at the speed of about 900 km per hour. While the Mirage is capable of flying at about 2,300 kmph, when it is armed with designation pods, electronic warfare equipment, a few laser-guided 1,000-kg bombs and so on, and flying at a low level to evade the enemy’s air defence radar, it would fly between 800 km and 900 km per hour.

While there are two Balakots — one near Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and the other in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa — the latter is 90 km from the Line of Control. With precision-guided munition getting released at the stand-off range of 20 km, the distance covered by the Mirage would be about 70 km. Thus, given the speed of the Mirage, it would not have been in hostile airspace for more than three to four minutes. Since there was a single target, called Designated Mean point of Impact (DMI), only one Mirage would have crossed the LoC. 

The IAF managed this feat because: (a) it would take any air force more than five minutes to detect and react (PAF reportedly did scramble its aircraft), unless war is on or is imminent, and (b) detection only by ground-based air defence systems (GBADS) without airborne early warning aircraft (which cannot stay airborne for more than 24 hours at a time), so the reaction cannot be very quick. Moreover, the strike time of 3:30 am, chosen by the IAF, was when GBADS observers would have been most inactive. After all, constant vigil in peacetime is not possible.

That said, the IAF did spring a surprise. Somebody in the PAF would pay the price for this lapse.

Having learnt a lesson from the earlier so-called ‘surgical strike’ by the Army in September 2016, no IAF official accompanied Gokhale for the briefing (the Foreign Secretary is not expected to know the technicalities), no questions were taken, and the term ‘surgical strike’ was avoided. Fully aware that the term is used only for blitzkrieg action against legitimate military targets or civilians, which air forces (and not armies) undertake, Gokhale’s briefing was meant as much for the domestic as for the international audience.

The terrorists’ casualty figures remain debatable since Gokhale merely mentioned ‘large numbers’. Since the government had come under criticism on the earlier occasion for immediately informing Pakistan about the surgical strike, this time a different tack was adopted. Pakistan was not informed, but its claim that no casualties took place was left unchallenged.

With the strike out of the way, the friendly social, electronic and print media would now step in to both glamorise and valorise the strike for political purposes. Already, stories are afloat that 12 Mirage fighters were used to kill more than 300 terrorists. It is nigh impossible for 12 fighters to enter Pakistan air space and come back unscathed. Moreover, retaliation, too, would have been assured. But this logic would not deter the believers. Nor would it affect the intensity of the proxy war by the Pakistan army in Jammu and Kashmir.

However, what will get strengthened is India’s case that Pakistan sponsors terrorism inside Jammu & Kashmir. Indian and international analysts are already active on social media, drawing the escalatory ladder. While the use of air power is definitive and escalatory, no nation would have thought of using it for political grandstanding. In that sense, this has been a masterstroke, which will accrue unexpected benefits. It is expected that major powers like the US would now make more efforts to rein in Pakistan’s proxy war. 

Though the stakes for China are extremely high, with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor designated as the flagship of the Belt and Road Initiative, China is unlikely to penalise Pakistan. While Beijing privately raps Rawalpindi for risking a conflict, it would continue to wholeheartedly support Pakistan, as both all-weather friends understands the difference between war fighting and political grandstanding.

There is likely be another outcome of the strike. The IAF, which had for long been clamouring for increased visibility and status like the Army, by asking for a role in counter-terror operations (CT ops), has now tasted blood. Since no one (including those in the defence services) believes that India would go to war, the military’s focus in the past several years has been on CT ops, where the Army has taken centre stage. This would no longer be the case, as the IAF would now look for a role greater than mere operational support.

However, these benefits will come at a cost for the IAF, the impact of which will be felt over the years, just as it is being felt in the Army. Since the air force is likely to be consulted by the political leadership on CT ops now (along with the Army), over time it will deflect attention from its core competencies. The military threats to India come from the disputed borders with Pakistan and China. The IAF, given the nature of modern war, is India’s only conventional deterrence against China. One can only hope that this does not get compromised.

The big question, though, is whether Pakistan has got the message that India means business. Unlikely. That message would only be received when India starts to reinforce its conventional war-fighting capabilities.