Shootout and after

The killing of eight CRPF personnel in Kashmir on Saturday was a grim reminder of the unpredictable ways of terror: the terrorist has the advantage of the element of surprise. The slightest of laxity can give an opportunity to the enemy to strike with disproportionate gains. With the long experience of insurgency behind them, our security forces are well aware of where the weak links might be, and how to secure those. The latest strike, therefore, demands a rigorous review of whether there has been any decline in the daily discipline of following the procedures.

What is more disturbing, however, is what followed the shootout. The Army took ‘credit’ for the counter operation that ended in the killing of two terrorists. This was vociferously objected to by officers of the CRPF, who accused the Army of taking away the attackers’ bodies and weapons unauthorisedly. For the common citizen, the death of personnel of any force is equally tragic. None is considered more valiant than the other. The ‘credit’ war, thus, indicates other unhealthy motivations at work. And these may be part of the larger reward and recognition system in place in the forces, particularly in the Kashmir valley.

The importance of discipline in any uniformed or armed force for their effectiveness is well understood. In an insurgency such as in Kashmir, security personnel’s discipline or lack of it has serious political implications. The Army has faced serious embarrassment over accusations of fake encounters or the killing of innocent civilians. Besides giving their detractors a moral edge, unprofessional conduct drains away the populace’s support and acceptance. And it would be unfair to blame only the men in the field. The top leadership has to take the responsibility. Every indiscretion they overlook is tacit encouragement for more. Nowhere in the world have armed men amidst civilians earned any laurels, yet the Indian Army has largely acquitted itself well. But maintaining the professional reputation requires constant vigil.